Abstract: As non-state actors, PMSCs are not embraced by traditional state-dominated doctrines of international law. However, international law has itself failed to keep pace with the evolution of states and state-based actors, to which strong Westphalian notions of 2 sovereignty are no longer applicable. It is argued that these structural inadequacies stand in the way of international regulation of PMSCs, rather than defects in international human rights and humanitarian law per se. By analyzing understandings of legal responsibility, where such structural issues come to the fore, it is argued that, rather than attempting to resolve the essentially ideological dispute about the inherent functions of a state, regulatory regimes should focus on the positive obligations of states and PMSCs, and the interactions between them. Applying the results of this analysis, current and proposed regulatory regimes are evaluated and their shortcomings revealed.
Introduction
This article puts forward an analysis of two main international legal approaches that are individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced‖, 14 oversimplifies, as Andre Nollkaemper argues, -the relationship between individual and state.‖ 15 As regards the actions of individuals like Adolf Eichmann in Nazi Germany, such crimes occurred, and could only occur according to Hannah Arendt, within a -criminal state‖; 16 in other words both individual and state bear responsibility for the sort of systematic and egregious crimes committed. The same analysis is applicable to human rights violations, and is reflected in the fact that human rights are embodied and protected in international law and are not necessarily guaranteed in the national legal systems of all states. Given that states (and international organizations) are committed to protect and uphold human rights at the international level, they must bear responsibility in international law when they are violated.
Furthermore, as Nollkaemper notes, the -remedies for state responsibility and for individual responsibility are different,‖ with the latter involving the punishment of individuals and the former involving reparations, though there can be overlaps between the two.
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In order to address the responsibilities of states, organizations, and corporations (in the form of PMSCs) this article initially considers how international law defines and delimits their responsibilities. In so doing, it highlights the substantive weaknesses of international law in attributing the wrongful acts of private actors to either the states or organizations employing them or otherwise having interaction with them. Furthermore, it highlights the structural weaknesses of international law in not imposing obligations directly on PMSCs as non-state actors. Given these circumstances, the article turns to consider whether the The premise underlying the approach contained in the Draft Convention is that there are inherently governmental or state functions that should not be delegated or outsourced.
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This is based on a certain understanding of the role of the state, a view that might not be shared by all governments, especially those with the most aggressive approaches to privatization. It contrasts with the Montreux Document, which identifies only prohibitions on contracting states outsourcing activities that international humanitarian law assigns to states (such as exercising the power of the responsible officer over prisoners of war or internment camps). 21 The Draft Convention defines inherent state functions broadly on the basis that they are -consistent with the principle of State monopoly on the legitimate use of force,‖ and cannot be outsourced or delegated to non-state actors. These functions include -direct participation in hostilities, waging war and/or combat operations, taking prisoners, law-making, espionage, intelligence, knowledge transfer with military, security and policing application, use of and other activities related to weapons of mass destruction and police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention including the interrogation of
See the preamble to the Draft Convention, which expresses concern about the "increasing delegation or outsourcing of inherently State functions which undermine any State's capacity to retain its monopoly on the legitimate use of force." See also Art. 1(1) Draft Convention. 21 Montreux Document, Part IA, para. 2. 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Assuming that a state contracts with a PMSC to perform functions such as escorting aid convoys and, furthermore, agrees with the PMSC that force can be used to protect those convoys, when lethal force is used it could be argued that the PMSC is acting under the instructions of the state, making the state directly responsible for the ensuing deaths. The doubt about this argument is in the formulation of the control test, which requires that the state has to be in effective control of the actual act, conduct, or operation in question. This is a high threshold to cross. 27 Although it may be argued that a contract for services should be construed as giving instructions to PMSCs, there could be doubt about whether those instructions were given in relation to the conduct or operation in question. conduct in question to allow for direct attribution of any wrongful conduct to those states.
Institutional Responsibility
Turning to an international organization's relationships with PMSCs, the latter could either increase of corporate influence in government. 46 Not conceding that the moral argument has been irrevocably lost, this article argues that even in such a weakened condition the state still has positive obligations to prevent human rights abuse by corporate actors it contracts with, or those which are based, or operating, within its jurisdiction.
Corporate (Social) Responsibility
It is unsurprising that just as international legal doctrine has failed to keep pace with the changing nature of sovereignty of the main actors (states), it has also failed to fully accommodate non-state actors within the subjects of the international legal order.
International organizations are the exception in this regard, for though they are non-state actors, they are formed by states, and states often dominate their institutional structures.
Nevertheless, the separate international legal personality of inter-governmental organizations states, organizations, and corporations will be provided below, before analyzing the Montreux Process and Draft Convention to see if they could provide the combination that Ruggie identifies.
Due Diligence
Given the weaknesses of international law in imposing direct responsibility on states, organizations, or corporations for the wrongful acts of individuals working for the latter, the specter is raised of a legal black hole in which PMSCs operate with impunity despite the existence of human rights law and international humanitarian law. 62 The solution may take the form of due diligence, by which these actors have obligations to try to prevent there is a fair degree of leeway in how due diligence should be implemented.
Home States
Developing the general principle of international law identified by the 
Host States
In international human rights law, cases such as the Velasquez Rodriguez case before the operate, has an obligation to exercise due diligence to protect anyone within its jurisdiction from human rights abuse, whether committed by state agents or private actors. As the IACtHR has stated, -an illegal act which violates human rights and which is … not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.‖ 71 Undoubtedly, many host states will be in a weak conflict or post-conflict condition, but they must not turn a blind eye to human rights abuses by private actors within their territory, and therefore must try to bring the perpetrators to justice with the resources available to them. In addition, Ruggie suggests that where the host state is weak and unable adequately to protect human rights, the home state of any transnational corporation involved should also endeavour to ensure that the corporation is not involved in human rights abuse. 
Contracting States
In addition to the possibility of directly imputable conduct discussed above, contracting states also have due diligence obligations. Ethically, it is due to the positive act of contracting for services with PMSCs that leads to wrongful acts being committed by their operatives; thus contracting governments should arguably bear responsibility above the home state, and certainly above the host state. Ruggie strongly argues that -states do not relinquish their international human rights law obligations when they privatize the delivery of services that should not contract with the PMSC in question. In this way it is contended that a contracting state has a positive obligation to undertake a human rights impact assessment of its decision to contract services to PMSCs or, alternatively, it has to have in place processes that give it confidence that the PMSC itself will undertake its own full impact assessment.
International Organizations
As an international legal person, bearing rights and duties under international law, 76 The OIOS was established by GA Res. 48/218B, July 29, 1994, to assist the UN Secretary General to fulfil his oversight responsibilities over staff and resources. The OIOS audits, evaluates, monitors, and inspects UN activities, including peacekeeping operations, and investigates reports of mismanagement and misconduct: www.un.org/depts/oios/pages/about_us/html (accessed February 3, 2012).
Although the due diligence obligations of states and organizations are binding customary obligations in international law, because corporations are not subjects of international law, any due diligence commitments they may have are non-binding outcomes of exercises in CSR. Although they are not subject to direct obligations under international law, corporations will be governed by national laws adopted by states in fulfilment of their human rights obligations to ensure that private actors within their jurisdictions do not violate human rights law. In this sense corporations would be wise, and would be expected, to respect human rights. This sense of CSR is the one used in Ruggie's -Framework‖, for instance in Principle 11, which states that -business enterprises should respect human rights,‖ meaning that -they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.‖ 78 According to Ruggie, the relevant human rights standards are to be found in the Universal Declaration, the International Covenants and eight core ILO Conventions. 79 As explained above, although these standards are not binding directly on corporations under international law, such actors are expected to comply if they want to avoid adverse publicity and reputational consequences, as well as government action against them under applicable national laws.  it should be an ongoing process that varies with the size and type of business;
 it should draw on internal and external human rights expertise and should involve meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups;
 it should involve the effective implementation of the findings of any human rights impact assessment by assigning responsibility within the business but also by ensuring that decision-making and oversight mechanisms are designed to respond to such impacts;
 it should include proper verification that human rights impacts are being addressed by businesses in tracking the effectiveness of their responses to impacts on individuals and groups, which can be done by obtaining feedback and by using indicators, surveys, and audits;
 and, finally, it should include effective communication by corporations of how they address human rights impacts -meetings, online dialogues, consultation, and formal reports are all suggested.
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Although responsible corporations are expected to fulfil these requirements, states are required by their positive obligations in international law to ensure their fulfilment. In these terms this binary form of responsibility -corporate social responsibility and state responsibility -has certain structural weakness arising out its dependency upon states having the primary legal obligation to ensure corporations act responsibly. This premise means that if a state is weak, or simply fails to recognize its obligations, the framework is undermined unless there is a mechanism at the international level that could help ensure that states take 86 Ibid., Principles 17-21 plus commentary.
action to ensure that PMSCs do not violate human rights. With that in mind, this analysis turns to the current international regulatory initiatives.
The Montreux Process
This of PMSCs through contracts, codes of conduct, national legislation, regional instruments and international standards. 89 In many ways the second part of the Montreux Document provides flesh to the due diligence bones of the first part, but its formulation in the form of -good practices‖ could be seen as recognition of the fact that due diligence standards may vary from state to state depending on their relationship to PMSCs.
What the Montreux Document does make clear in the first part is that all three types of states -home, host, and contracting -owe due diligence obligations to ensure respect for international humanitarian law by PMSCs and to give effect to their human rights obligations by taking appropriate measures to prevent, investigate, and provide effective remedies for PMSC conduct. 90 Part Two then provides some detail of how these might be honored by states and here there is some variation, as expected, between the different types of state (though there is a large element of overlap in matters such as training). For contracting states, as well as indicating the procedures and criteria for selection of contractors, there is the expectation that the contract will include clauses and performance requirements to ensure respect for humanitarian and human rights law, and a stipulation that lowest price should not be the only criterion for selection. 91 For host and home states, good practice would require them to authorize PMSCs operating or based on their territories, by having systems of licences, to be granted only after vetting of PMSCs as regards their policy statements, track records, monitoring and accountability systems, and training provision.
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Although it can readily be construed as a significant contribution to recognizing the The purpose here is not to go through all the Code of Conduct's provisions and consider whether they completely fulfil the due diligence requirements identified earlier. In a sense that is not possible, given that due diligence is not by any means a precise science, but the indications are that the code has strengths in CSR terms. On applicable human rights standards, the code does have well-developed and quite specific rules on the use of force, and on detention, as well as the following prohibitions:
 on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;
 on sexual abuse and gender based violence;
 on human trafficking;
 on slavery and forced labor;
 on child labor;
 and on discrimination. Nevertheless, the operation of the Draft Charter, assuming it comes into force, will determine whether it is a robust mechanism of oversight and accountability, or more of a symbolic form of CSR.
The Draft Convention
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Ibid., paras. 9 and 11. The current lack of domestic remedies is shown by the scarcity of domestic cases in which individuals have successfully sued PMSCs. In terms of litigation against PMSCs, there appears to be little more than a handful of U.S. cases -see the country-specific chapters in Multilevel Regulation, eds. Bakker and Sossai, 123-526. 132 Draft Convention, Art. 37.
PMSCs based in or operating on their territory, or employed by them. procedures, and by allowing for individuals to bring complaints to the oversight mechanism alleging violations of the code. 136 However, the Draft Charter's provisions are obscurely worded and seem to provide a great deal of leeway for PMSCs. In particular, the provisions present them with a chance, in the face of a complaint against them, to conduct an internal investigation and put forward proposals for remediation. Even more worryingly, it also allows the oversight mechanism itself to reject not only frivolous complaints, but complaints that are too challenging due to the -difficulties in establishing facts in the context of activities that take place in complex environments.‖ 137 A reluctance to consider, let alone investigate, complex cases, is not encouraging evidence of the type of CSR remedial mechanism envisaged by Ruggie.
The Draft Convention, on the other hand, does in general oblige states to provide the sort of remedies and access to them required by the -Protect, Respect and Remedy‖ framework, and furthermore provides oversight and remedial processes at the international level. As outlined above, the Draft Convention generally envisages that such remedies will be 
